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Abstract
“Fly-by-night” is a derisive term for a firm that appears to be untrustworthy and/or 
transient. Previous studies have focused on general fly-by-night firms’ behavior and their 
interaction with the credit market, while much less has been done to show how they approach 
government regulation. After a brief explanation of the importance of studying fly-by-night firms 
and a discussion of some relevant literature, this paper presents a simple model that permits a 
liability-holding fly-by-night entrepreneur to choose between complying or not complying with 
a governmental regulation. Though perhaps most useful as a classroom exercise, the model could 
be used to examine what factors affect the compliance decision and in what way. I find that (i) 
if we assume fly-by-night firms have relatively lower probabilities of project success, then they 
are unambiguously less likely to comply with governmental regulations; (ii) an increase in the 
interest rate on business loans decreases the probability of compliance; and (iii) from a regulatory 
standpoint, an increase in inspection rates deters non-compliance, but an increase in the non-
compliance fine may not exert deterrence if strategic default is an option.
JEL Codes: L29, L59
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1. Introduction
In the world of business, the term “fly-by-night” is typically used to describe a person or firm that is unreliable, untrustworthy, transient, or financially irresponsible—one 
who runs away to escape debts or one who masks its true quality. Such firms can harm 
consumers, creditors, and the laborers they employ. Consumers of fly-by-night goods and 
services are prone to overpay for these goods, given their true quality. Creditors of fly-by-
night entrepreneurs are at risk of not being repaid the money they are owed. Employees of 
fly-by-night entrepreneurs are at risk of both having their reputations tarnished and not 
receiving their due wages. For example, the firm could default and not honor its payroll.
Thus, studying, detecting, and exposing fly-by-night entrepreneurs can benefit several 
parties. Since it would be naive always to expect a truthful answer when asking firm owners 
about their true nature or the true quality of their product, we need other tools to help study 
or detect the presence of fly-by-nights. Economic theory is one such tool. Modeling the 
decision-making process of firms can aid in the explanation of these decisions.
The current fly-by-night literature has focused on firms’ general behavior and how 
they interact with the credit market. Little has been done to show how these firms deal 
with government regulation. Using a game-theoretic framework, this analysis attempts 
to do just that. Here, a fly-by-night entrepreneur plays a regulator-agent game against 
a regulatory agent. In this simultaneous-move game, the entrepreneur chooses whether 
or not to comply with some imposed regulation, and the regulator chooses the level of 
inspection. The model’s outcome helps demonstrate what factors determine the choice 
made by the entrepreneur.
The rest of the paper is structured in the following manner: Section 2 highlights several 
previous studies within both the fly-by-night and regulation literatures, the basis upon 
which my model draws some of its assumptions. In Section 3, I set up the model, work 
through it, and perform some comparative statics. Section 4 concludes the analysis by 
discussing the implications of the model.
2. Previous Studies
Becker (1968) provided the “benchmark” model, as it were, for regulation compliance. 
Non-compliance fines are treated as any other cost of doing business. The model includes 
an enforcement agency whose efforts impact the expected penalties. Firms make a binary 
compliance decision and are assumed to act to minimize the sum of expected compliance 
costs plus expected penalties. The model concludes (somewhat obviously) that increasing 
either inspection rates or non-compliance penalties raises population compliance. 
Becker’s (1968) benchmark model has a long list of simplifying assumptions, and many 
authors have expanded upon it and studied other aspects of regulation and compliance. For 
example, some authors (e.g., Heyes (1993)) have focused on inspectability and contested 
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enforcement; some (e.g., Kaplow and Shavell (1994)) self-reporting; some (e.g., Harrington 
(1988)) have extended the model to incorporate multiple periods; some (e.g., Sandmo 
(1998)) have incorporated risk aversion; and some (e.g., Bebchuk and Kaplow (1992)) have 
incorporated imperfect information. While the model presented here is abstract enough 
so that the regulation need not refer to a specific type, the example given is that of an 
environmental regulation on the production process of the entrepreneur’s project. Heyes 
(2000) provides a good discussion of the literature on the implementation of environmental 
regulation, its enforcement, and compliance.
Parallel to the theoretical literature, an empirical literature on the compliance and 
enforcement of regulations has developed. For example, Gray and Deily (1996) examine 
air pollution data from the United States steel industry to estimate plant-level compliance 
and enforcement functions. The authors find that greater enforcement does indeed lead 
to greater compliance while greater compliance leads to less enforcement. Perhaps more 
interesting is that they find that firm characteristics (e.g., firm size, diversification, and 
gross cash flows) have little impact on compliance decisions. Feinstein (1989) collects data 
from over 1000 Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspections and performs a similar study 
of nuclear power plants while Epple and Visscher (1984), in a well-known paper, examine 
the occurrence, detection, and deterrence of marine oil spills. For further studies of this 
type, consult Fuller (1987), Harrison (1995), Laplante and Rilstone (1996), and Regens et 
al. (1997).
The literature on fly-by-night firms is quite scant. Faulhaber and Yao (1989) explain 
the effect of information asymmetry on the number of fly-by-night firms in an industry or 
an economy. The authors note that the lower the information asymmetry in an industry, the 
higher the quality becomes, and thus allowing fewer fly-by-night firms to enter. While their 
analysis mainly focused on the information asymmetry between the firms and consumers, 
Faulhaber and Yao also discussed the effect of asymmetry between firms and lenders. In 
certain markets, those with high levels of information asymmetry, lenders may loan to risky 
firms at the same or a similar rate as they loan to nearly riskless firms. If the lender is aware 
of the likelihood of a project’s success, however, then he or she will take this information 
into account when determining the interest rate on the loan. In the model presented here, 
the entrepreneur is assumed to have already received a business loan to finance a project. 
Boyd and Ingberman (2003) assert that premature dissolution is common among fly-
by-nights and is actually a rational corporate response to the threat of future liability. By 
definition, fly-by-night firms often engage in risky projects. Such a firm could choose to 
dissolve or default if they find themselves facing a large future liability. I incorporate this 
realization into my model by assuming the entrepreneurs have the option of dissolution/
default if the risky business project they are engaging in fails or if they receive a non-
compliance fine from a regulatory agent that is greater than their expected profits.
3.  The Model
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3.1  Assumptions and Variable Definitions
The model begins with an entrepreneur who has already decided to take on a single project 
in the pursuit of profit. This project has some probability of success p where 0 < p < 1 and, 
thus, a (1-p) probability of failure. A failed project yields zero revenue for the entrepreneur. 
A successful project results in R revenue for the entrepreneur. Revenue here refers to its 
strict definition (income a firm receives from its business activities) and is not to be confused 
with profit (which is revenue minus all business costs).
 The entrepreneur is assumed to be initially assetless and therefore must take out 
a loan to pay for the project’s production inputs. The loan amount is denoted by variable 
K and the interest rate on the loan denoted by r. The market for loans is assumed to be 
perfectly competitive, and this assumption also negates the need for a third player, the 
loan officer. If the project fails, the entrepreneur will default and not repay the loan or the 
interest.
 Assume also that there exists some sort of regulation pertaining to the production 
process of the project. An example of such a regulation could be a government-imposed 
environmental regulation such as one requiring the entrepreneur to use scrubbers on 
smoke stacks.1 The variable C will represent the entrepreneur’s cost of complying with the 
regulation. Keeping with the environmental regulation example, this would include the cost 
of buying, installing, and maintaining the scrubbers. The entrepreneur has to decide whether 
or not to comply with the regulation. As we assume away any moral cost2 of compliance, the 
entrepreneur will only consider the expected profits of each option when deciding whether 
or not to comply. If he or she decides not to comply, there is some probability m where 0 < 
m < 1 that they will be caught and, thus, probability (1-m) they will “get away” with non-
compliance. For simplicity, assume that if the entrepreneur is inspected, then the chance of 
getting caught is 100 percent. Thus, m can now be thought of as the probability of being 
inspected by the regulator.3
 If caught, the entrepreneur must pay a fine of some monetary amount F which 
is assumed to be some value such that F > R – (1+r)K. In words, the fine is larger than the 
entrepreneur’s profit since R is revenue and (1+r)K is the amount of the loan repayment or 
costs. Since this would incur a net loss on the entrepreneur, if he is caught, he will default 
and receive a net profit of zero. The variable B will denote the overall bonus or reward given 
to the regulatory agent in charge of inspection for catching and turning in an entrepreneur 
who did not comply and is common to regulator-agent games. This could include, but is 
1  Scrubber systems are air pollution control devices that are used to remove some of the particulates 
and/or gases from industrial exhaust streams.
2  In this context, moral cost refers to the non-monetary (emotional/psychological) costs of not abiding 
by the regulation.
3  This point is made because a few regulator-agent models in the literature allow for the possibility of 
being inspected and still not getting caught. For the purposes of this analysis, allowing for this scenario would 
further complicate the mathematics while not adding much to the results.
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not limited to, a simple monetary bonus, an increase in funding, or simply the benefit of 
maintaining the current level of funding.
3.2  The Entrepreneur’s Compliance Decision Process
With the game set and assumptions made, the compliance decision process can now be 
investigated. Since the entrepreneur can simply default if the project fails or if he gets 
caught not complying with the regulation, the entrepreneur’s decision on whether or not to 
comply with the regulation can be expressed by the relatively simple inequality
                                    (1)
If default is not an option, Equation (1) would contain more terms.4 The left-hand side of 
this inequality describes the expected value of compliance while the right-hand side does 
the same for non-compliance. If the left-hand side of Equation (1) is greater than or equal 
to the right, then the entrepreneur will comply with the regulation. If not, then he will 
choose not to comply and take the chance of getting caught. 
This decision can be further examined in terms of the key variables. Reducing Equation 
(1) in terms of project revenue yields
                                                             (2)
A high value of R will result in compliance and a value less than the right-hand side of 
Equation (2) will result in non-compliance. A similar simplification can be made for the 
probability of detection m. Solving Equation (1) for m yields
                                                                (3)
Here, a high value of m results in compliance and a value less than the right-hand side of 
Equation (3) results in non-compliance. Since fly-by-night firms are often characterized 
by a low probability of project success, then it can be especially valuable to look at the 
compliance decision in terms of p. Holding m constant, Figure 1 shows the critical value of 
project success (call it p*) where p* separates those entrepreneurs who will comply with the 
regulation (those with p > p*) from those who will not (those with p < p*).
4  See the Appendix for this full inequality.
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Figure 1: Compliance and the probability of project success
Thus, the riskier the project, the more likely the firm will violate the regulation. At 
the same time, Equation (2) shows that relatively larger values of project revenue result in 
compliance. Normally, firms only partake in risky projects when the revenue that success 
would yield is large. A fly-by-night-minded entrepreneur, however, may act differently and 
engage in risky projects more readily.
3.3  The Loan
Now, I turn to the credit market. The loan given to the entrepreneur will exhibit the property
                                          (4)
where α represents the proportion of firms that do not comply with the governmental 
regulation and 0 < α < 1. This is because a value of K less than the right-hand side of the 
above equation would result in a loss to the lender. Hence, they would not lend in such 
a scenario. If project failure still yielded some positive revenue (for example, if resources 
could be sold for scrap) or if the non-compliance fine was not larger than R – (1+r)K, then 
Equation (4) would contain more terms.5 Equation (4) is a strict equality since the market 
for loans was assumed to be perfectly competitive.
Reducing Equation (4) in terms of the gross interest rate (1+r) yields
                                                            (5)
While the lender is not a player (decision maker) in the game, it is important to consider 
this property of the loan so that it may be applied to the model. Looking at the loan in 
terms of the gross interest rate, as in Equation (5), shows that r is negatively correlated with 
the probability of project success while positively correlated with the inspection rate. I now 
turn to the second player, the regulator.
5  For this “more complete” loan equation, see the Appendix.
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3.4  The Regulator
Like the entrepreneur, the regulator wishes to maximize his or her own “revenue.” The 
critical decision is how much effort to put into inspection. Hence, in this simplistic game, 
the regulator chooses m. Choosing a larger value of m, the regulator both increases the 
number of potentially caught non-compliers and increases the amount of work they have to 
do (what one could call the cost of inspection). I assume the regulator’s objective function 
to be:
                                                                 (6)
Thus, the regulator chooses the optimal m given B and α. This objective function was chosen 
because it has the necessary properties. First, increases in the bonus received for catching a 
non-complier and increases in the percentage of firms that are non-compliers both result in 
higher optimal inspection rates. Second, increases in inspection rates exponentially increase 
the cost of inspection. Lastly, it yields a simple derivative. Taking the first order derivative 
of Equation (6) with respect to m and setting this equal to zero, as in Equation (7), gives 
the optimal inspection effort:
                                                   (7)
3.5  Non-Compliers
Writing the entrepreneur’s compliance decision in terms of revenue (R), as in Equation 
(2), as a strict equality gives a critical “comply or not” value of R. I denote this value  in the 
expression:
                                                   (8)
Recall that entrepreneurs with values of R below  choose not to comply with the regulation, 
ceteris paribus, and this portion of entrepreneurs is denoted as α. This implies (1-α) denotes 
the portion of entrepreneurs that comply. Name the lower and upper bounds of the critical 
“comply or not” value of revenue  and , respectively. One can normalize the distance 
(or difference) between these lower and upper bounds ( - ) to unity. Figure 2 presents a 
simple visual representation of the portion of complying firms taking into account this 
normalization.
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Figure 2: The portion of firms that will comply
In general terms, α is now:
                                                                    (9)
Plugging the critical value  from Equation (8) into Equation (9) gives:
                                                 (10)
which is a more explicit definition of the portion of firms that will choose not to comply 
with the regulation.
3.6  Combining Compliance, Inspection, and the Loan
In this section, I combine what has been learned of the portion of non-compliers, the gross 
interest rate, and the optimal inspection rate so that comparative statics can be performed 
in Section 3.8. Plugging the optimal inspection rate from Equation (7) into the previously 
derived equilibrium gross interest rate, Equation (5), gives the formula:
                                                       (11)
Then, plugging Equation (11) and Equation (7) into  yields:
                                             (12)
Now we can take this new information and incorporate it into α which gives:
                                                  (13)
Notice the normalization  was also used to obtain the above formula. Thus, we have derived 
a new expression for the portion of entrepreneurs who will choose not to comply with the 
regulation that takes into account the decision made by the regulator and the characteristics 
of the credit market.
3.7  Equilibrium Inspection and Compliance
Figure 3 displays the equilibrium values of α and m in a graphical framework. Recall 
Equation (7) is the regulator’s optimal choice of m given α. As one would expect, the 
greater the proportion of non-complying firms, the higher the regulator’s optimal m—
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hence the positively sloping curve labeled Equation (7). The slope of this line is B. Also 
recall that Equation (10) implies that for larger values of α, m must decrease for the lender 
to lend at the same interest rate—hence the negatively sloping curve labeled Equation (10).
Figure 3: Equilibrium compliance and inspection rates
The intersection of the two curves gives an equilibrium level of inspection (m*) and an 
equilibrium portion of non-compliers (α*).
3.8  Comparative Statics
For those less familiar with economic theory, comparative statics is the comparison of two 
different economic outcomes, before and after a change in some parameter. First, I will 
examine the impact of a change in the interest rate on business loans on the portion of firms 
that choose not to comply with regulations, that is, the effect of r on α. The equilibrium 
gross interest rate from Equation (5) can be rewritten as:
                                                  (14)
For further simplicity, we might rewrite the gross interest rate (1+r) as θ. Consequently, 
plugging the regulator›s optimal decision from Equation (7) into Equation (14) yields:
                                                       (15)
From Equation (15), it is easy to see that if the interest rate increases, then, ceteris paribus, α 
must increase to keep the equality steady. Thus, an increase in the interest rate results in an 
increase in the number of non-complying firms.
Another important relationship, that was already discussed briefly in Section 3.2, is 
that of the probability of project success and the compliance rate. That is, the impact of a 
change in p on α. As of Section 3.2, the properties of the loan and the regulator›s decision 
process had not yet entered the model, so it might be prudent to revisit this impact. Recall 
194 Spring 2013
Scientia et Humanitas: A Journal of Student Research
the value derived previously for  from Equation (12), here with the bounds dropped from 
the expression:
                                                        (16)
From Equation (16), it can be shown that an increase in the value of p, ceteris paribus, would 
result in a decrease in α. In words, the higher the probability of project success, the smaller 
the portion of non-complying firms.
4  Discussion
This simple model results in three key findings. First, if we assume that fly-by-night firms 
are those with a low value of project success (p) or define them as such, then, ceteris paribus; 
fly-by-nights are unambiguously less likely to comply with regulations. This assumes there 
is some positive financial cost of compliance. Second, it has been shown that an increase in 
the interest rate on commercial loans makes non-compliance even more likely. 
The third finding is perhaps the most interesting. From a regulatory standpoint, the 
entrepreneur’s compliance decision shows that an increase in inspection (m) would deter 
non-compliance but an increase in the fine (F) would not. This results in the following 
policy implication. To encourage compliance, regulatory agents should increase inspection 
rates instead of raising the non-compliance penalty. This finding, however, rests heavily on 
the assumptions of the model; namely that F > R – (1+r)K and, therefore, the entrepreneur 
can and likely will strategically default if caught being non-compliant. In the framework of 
this simple model, the way to increase inspection rates is to get policymakers to increase B, 
the benefit to the regulatory agent of catching a non-complier.
While relatively simple, this model could be used as a base for future models. Several 
aspects could be altered to fit more specific scenarios. Assumptions like the initial “asset-
lessness” of the entrepreneur could be relaxed. Additional complexities could also be added. 
For example, an informal credit market could be included increasing the loan options of 
the entrepreneur. Alternatively or additionally, one could allow for corruption on part of 
the regulator making the payment of bribes an option for the fly-by-night entrepreneur. 
Unchanged, the model can serve as a classroom demonstration, particularly as an example 
of an extended regulator-agent game.
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Appendix
The Entrepreneur’s Decision without Strategic Default
The entrepreneur’s complete compliance decision could have been expressed as p[R-(1+r)
K]-(1-p)(1+r)K-C ≥ p(1-m)[R-(1+r)K]-(1-p)(1-m)(1+r)K+pm[R-(1+r)K-F]-(1-p)m[(1+r)
K+F] if the option of strategic default had not been allowed. All terms represent monetary 
amounts. The left side of the inequality refers to regulation compliance while the right 
side refers to non-compliance. From left to right, the three terms on the left side of the 
inequality represent project success, project failure, and the cost of compliance. From left 
to right, the terms on the right side of the inequality represent project success without 
inspection, project failure without inspection, project success with inspection, and project 
failure with inspection. Since default was allowed in the model presented in the body of 
the paper, the terms that describe situations of project failure and/or inspection under non-
compliance can be reduced to zero and become irrelevant in the entrepreneur’s compliance 
decision process. Reducing this expression along these lines results in Equation (1): p[R-
(1+r)K]-C ≥ p(1-m)[R-(1+r)K].
A More Complete Loan Equation
For those interested in a more complete loan equality, it could be expressed as K=p(1-α)
(1+r)K+pα(1-m)(1+r)K+(1-p)(1-α)K+(1-p)α(1-m)K+pαmK+(1-p)αmK where K denotes 
the loan amount. Again, the equation is a strict equality under the assumption of a perfectly 
competitive market for business loans. From left to right, the right-hand-side terms 
represent project success and regulation compliance, success and non-compliance without 
inspection, failure and compliance, failure and non-compliance without inspection, success 
and non-compliance with inspection, and failure and non-compliance with inspection. 
Under the assumption that the entrepreneur will default if either caught not complying 
with the regulation or project failure, then the last four terms become irrelevant and 
reduce to zero. Thus, the equation can be reduced by multiplying out the zeroed terms and 
combining some like factors to yield Equation (4).
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